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Plaintiffs and Appellants Stephen E. Brendle and 
Richard L. Maires (collectively referred to herein as "Lot 
Owners* or "Owners") hereby submit, pursuant to Rules 24 and 26 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, their opening brief 
with respect to the district court's Ruling and Order 
upholding the decision of the Draper City Council to prohibit 
Owners from constructing a home on a lot they own in Draper 
and the trial court's dismissal of Owner's other claims 
pursuant to a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant City of 
Draper (hereinafter "Draper/) 
JURISDICTION OP THE COURT OP APPEALS 
This is an appeal of right taken from a final Ruling 
and Order entered after a ron-jury trial and from the district 
court's ruling on Draper's Motion to Dismiss. No post-
judgment motions were filed by either party. The final Ruling 
and Order appealed from was entered on November 27, 1995. 
Owners filed a timely Notice of Appeal on December 22, 1995. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (j) has been "poured 
over" to the Court of Appeals. 
ISSUES PRESENTED BY THIS APPEAL 
1. Did the Draper City Council lack jurisdiction to 
review the earlier approval by the Draper City Planning 
Commission of Owners' construction of a home on their Lot 
after the expiration of the statutory period for appeal from 
1 
the planning commissions decision to allow construction to 
proceed? 
(a) Standard of review: Whether the expiration of 
an appeals period deprives a decision making entity from 
jurisdiction to further consider a mater is a conclusion of 
law. [cite], as such the trial court's decision is reviewed 
for correctness. United Park City Mines CQT Vt Greater Park 
City Co.
 r 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Ut^h 1993); Kasco Services Corp. 
v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah 1993). 
(b) Issue preserved f<?r appeal: [R. at 37-39; 84-
85] 
2. Did the trial court err in determining that Owners 
had not obtained a vested right to proceed with the 
construction of a home on their lot after the Appellants had 
obtained a valid building permit and secured approval from the 
Draper City Planning Commission and the time for all appeals 
from said decision had expired? 
(a) Standard of review: The trial court ruled, as 
a conclusion of law, that Owners had not obtained a vested 
right to proceed with development of their Lot. See [R. at 
224]. Such conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness.. 
United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co.. 870 P.2d 
880, 885 (Utah 1993); Kasco Services Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 
86, 89 (Utah 1993). 
2 
(b) Issue preserved for appeal: [R. at 12-13, 39-
40, 224]. 
3. Is Draper equitably estopped from halting Owner's 
use and enjoyment of their property by Appellants1 detrimental 
reliance on the permission to proceed with construction that 
was granted by the Draper City Planning Commission, in that 
Owners have, on the basis of a validly issued building permit, 
began construction, including the excavation and pouring of a 
foundation for their home, at great expense to Owners? 
(a) Standard of review: The trial court ruled, as 
a conclusion of law, that Draper was not equitably estopped 
from enforcing its zoning ordinances to stop Owners1 
construction on their Lot. See [R. at 224]. This conclusion 
of law is reviewed for correctness.. United Park City Mines 
Co, v, Greater ParK City Co,, 870 p.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993); 
Kasco Services Corpt Vt Benson/ 831 p.2d 86, 89 (Utah 1993). 
(b) Issue preserved for appeal: [R. at 13-14, 39-
40, 224]. 
4. Did the trial court err in dismissing Owners1 
constitutional claims for uncompensated takings under the Utah 
and federal constitutions, their claims under Utah's 
declaratory relief act, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and for denial 
of equal protection of the laws? 
(a) Standard of review: Whether the dismissal of 
a claim pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is proper is a 
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conclusion of law. Stt Benedict's PeVt CPt Vt St, Benedict's 
Hospital, 8ii p.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991); Hansen Yt Pept, of 
Fin. Institutionsf 858 P.2d 184, 186 (Utah App. 1993). Such 
conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness.. United Park 
City Mines Co» v, Greater Park City Cpt, 870 p.2d 880, 885 
(Utah 1993); Kasco Services Corpt Y» Benson/ 831 p.2d 86, 89 
(Utah 1993) . 
(b) Issue preserved for appeal: [R. at 127-32]. 
5. Was the decision of the Draper City Council to 
reverse the earlier decision of the Draper City Planning 
Commission to allow Owners to proceed with construction on 
their lot arbitrary, capricious or illegal in light of its 
failure to address the appropriate factors specified by the 
Draper City's Hillside Ordinance? 
(a) standard of review: The Court of Appeals, in 
reviewing the trial court's review of the zoning decisions of 
Draper "owes no particular deference to the trial court's 
review of a particular agency action." Technomedical Labsf 
Inct Vt Utah Securities Div,, 744 p.2d 320 (ut. App. 1987). 
To the extent the trial court's decision is based upon the 
testimony of witnesses, the court of appeals must defer to the 
trial court's advantaged position to hear, weigh and evaluate 
the testimony of the parties. Davis County v. Clearfield 
City, 756 P.2d 704 (Ut. App. 1988). 
(b) Issue preserved for appeal: [R. at 40-41; 357]. 
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6, Was the decision of the Draper City Council to 
reverse the earlier decision of the Draper City Planning 
Commission based on "public clamorM rather than a consideration 
of the appropriate decision-making factors. 
(a) Standard of review: The Court of Appeals, in 
reviewing the trial court's review of the zoning decisions of 
Draper "owes no particular deference to the trial court's 
review of a particular agency action." Technomedical Labs, 
Inct Vt Utah Securities Divf, 744 p.2d 320 (ut. App. 1987). 
To the extent the trial court's decision is based upon the 
testimony of witnesses, the court of appeals must defer to the 
trial court's advantaged position to hear, weigh and evaluate 
the testimony of the parties. Davis County yt Clearfield 
City, 756 P.2d 704 (Ut. App. 1988). 
(b) Issue preserved for appeal; [R. at 358-59]. 
7. Did the trial court err, in light of its express 
finding that the Draper City Planning Commission granted 
permission to Appellants to proceed with construction on the 
basis of a mutual mistake of fact (with no bad faith or deceit 
on the part of Appellants) in determining that Draper had the 
authority and right to reconsider the planning commission1s 
earlier action and that Owners therefore did not obtain a 
vested right to proceed with the construction of their home 
and Draper was not therefore equitably estopped from halting 
Owners' construction of the home? 
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(a) Standard of review: The trial court ruled, as 
a finding of fact that there had been a mutual mistake of fact 
regarding the lack of opposition to Owners1 continued 
development of their Lot and that the decision of the Draper 
Planning Commission to allow such construction was based on 
that mutual mistake (which came about without any bad faith on 
the part of Owners.) See [R at 223-24]. Based on those 
findings of fact, the trial court, held as conclusions of 
law, that Draper could re-open the decision after the 
expiration of the appeals period, that Owners had not acquired 
vested rights to proceed with construction and that Draper was 
not equitably estopped from enforcing its zoning ordinances to 
stop Owners1 construction on their Lot. See [R. at 224]. 
These conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness.. 
United Park City Mines CPt yy Greater Park City QQf, 870 p.2d 
880, 885 (Utah 1993); Kasco Services Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 
86, 89 (Utah 1993). 
(b) Issue preserved for appeal: [R. at 360-62]. 
STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the decision of the trial court 
upholding the decision of the Draper City Council to stop 
construction of a residence on a subdivision lot owned by 
Owners after Owners had previously obtained a building permit 
and commenced construction of a home on the lot. After 
Draper's untimely reversal of its previously granted 
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authorization to Owners to proceed with construction on their 
lot, Owners commenced this judicial action asserting that: 
Draper lacked jurisdiction to reconsider its earlier action; 
that Owners had acquired a "vested right" to proceed with the 
construction of their home; that Draper was equitably estopped 
to prevent Owners' completion of the home they had commenced 
building on the basis of reasonable reliance on Draper's 
earlier decision; that the issuance of the "stop work" Order 
by Draper was arbitrary, capricious and illegal; and that 
Draper's actions violated Owners' constitutional rights under 
the "takings/ "due process" and "equal protection" clauses of 
the United States and Utah Constitutions. 
The trial court issued a ruling in response to Draper's 
Motion to Dismiss that Owners' Complaint would be treated as 
a "Petition for Review" and that the Court would therefore 
conduct an "appellate" review of Draper's actions. This ruling 
implicitly dismissed Owners' constitutional claims and limited 
the scope of Owners' rights at the evidentiary hearing. After 
taking evidence, the trial court issued a written Ruling and 
Order in which it held that Draper's actions were not 
arbitrary or capricious, that Draper had jurisdiction to 
revoke the prior authorization granted to Owners, that Owners 
had not obtained a vested right to proceed with the 
development on their lot and that Draper was not equitably 
estopped from halting Owners' building on their lot. Owners 
7 
filed this timely appeal from the trial court's final Ruling 
and Order. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. In April 1994, Owners entered into an Option 
Agreement to purchase Lot 304 in the Cove at Bear Canyon (the 
"Lot"). Ex. 1,[R. at 250-51]. 
2. The Lot is sloped and bordered on the upper (east) 
and lower (west) sides by streets in a platted subdivision. 
As originally platted, the Lot was intended to have a home 
constructed on the west end of the Lot facing the lower 
street. [R. at 252-53]. 
3. In constructing the lower street, however, the 
subdivision's developers made "cuts" into the lower end of the 
Lot that made the lower end impossibly steep and, as a 
practical matter, unbuildable. [R. at 252]. 
4. Because of these discrepancies between the 
subdivision plat and the actually constructed subdivision, 
Owners made their purchase of the Lot contingent upon 
receiving approval from Draper to locate a home on the upper 
end of the lot, facing east. Ex. 1; [R. at 251-52]. 
5. After an on-site inspection by the Draper City 
engineer, who "concurred" with *Lhe relocation of the home to 
the east end of the Lot, Owners obtained a building permit and 
authorization from Draper's planning and zoning commission to 
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proceed with construction on the east end of the Lot. [R. at 
253]; Exs. 3 and 4. 
6. In reliance on the building permit and permission to 
proceed with construction, Owners exercised the option and 
purchased the Lot for $61,000, [R. at 262]. 
7. On April 27, 1994, Owners commenced construction of 
a luxury home on the Lot. Ex. 12. 
8. In June 1994, however, Draper received complaints 
from owners of lots located on the eastern street (although 
not contiguous to, or even in sight of the Lot) that Owners' 
home might obstruct their views, and Draper City issued a 
"Stop Work" Order. [R. at 270-71]. 
9. At a hearing before the Draper Planning Commission, 
on June 13, 1994, the issuance of the "Stop Work" Order, was 
upheld. The basis for this decision was ostensibly the Draper 
Hillside Ordinance, which prohibited construction on slopes in 
excess of 30%. The opposing testimony presented at the 
hearing, however, focused on the views of the neighboring 
landowners and the amounts they had paid for their lots as 
opposed to the price paid by Owners. [R. at 270-72]. 
10. On August 23, 1994 Owners appealed the planning 
commission's decision to the Draper City Council. Once again 
certain neighbors objected on the grounds that their views 
might be obstructed. [R. at 74]. 
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11. Having exhausted their administrative remedies, 
Owners filed a Petition for Review in the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, Civil No. 94 09059588A, on 
September 21, 1994. In a Ruling and Order dated April 18, 
1995, the District Court determined that the actions of the 
Planning Commission and the City Council were not arbitrary 
and capricious. [R. at 74-75]. 
12. Following the District Court's ruling, Owners 
contacted the developer for the subdivision containing their 
Lot to discuss "trading" for another lot or obtaining a refund 
on their purchase of the "unbuildable" Lot. [R. at 272]. 
13. The developer informed Owners that he believed that 
with his assistance they could obtain approval from Draper to 
proceed with the construction of the house on the east end of 
the Lot. [R. at 273-74]; Ex. 9A. 
14. Prior to the expiration of the period for appealing 
the District Court's determination, Plaintiffs asked the 
Planning Commission to reconsider its previous decision. Ex. 
9A. After considering all of the factors relevant under the 
Hillside Ordinance, the Planning Commission voted on April 20, 
1995, to allow Owners to proceed with the construction of the 
home on the east end of the Lot. Ex. 10A. 
15. Under section 6-1-4 (B) of the Land Use and 
Development Regulations of Draper City, an appeal from a 
decision of the Planning Commission "shall be filed in writing 
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with the City Recorder within fourteen (14) days of the 
Planning Commission's decision ...." Ex. 11. 
16. No written appeal of the decision to allow Owners to 
proceed with construction on the Lot was filed with the Draper 
City Recorder within the fourteen-day period. [R. at 284]. 
17. In reliance on the April 20, 1995, decision of the 
Planning Commission and after expiration of the period for 
appeal, Owners incurred expenses in excess of $50,000 in 
pouring the foundation for the home on the east end of the 
Lot. [R. at 289]. 
18. On or about June 1, 1995, however, Owners learned 
that a property owner on the eastern street had asked the 
Draper Planning Commission to reconsider its decision, despite 
the fact that Owners had poured their foundation and the 
period for appeal had expired. These objecting parties 
asserted that they had not received notice of the April 20, 
1995 decision of the Draper Planning Commission. Ex. 13, [R. 
at 291]. 
19. Notwithstanding Plaintiffs1 objection that the 
planning commission lacked jurisdiction to reconsider its 
earlier decision after the expiration of the appeals period, 
the Draper Planning Commission reheard the matter on June 8, 
1995. On that date, the Planning Commission again voted to 
allow its earlier decision to allow building on the east end 
of the Lot to proceed. Ex. 10B. 
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20. An appeal was sought with the Draper City Council on 
June 9, 1995, and Owners again objected that Draper lacked 
jurisdiction to change the April 20 decision of the Planning 
Commission. Despite these objections, the City Council 
reversed the Planning Commission's decision to allow Owners to 
proceed with construction on the east end of their Lot. Ex. 
IOC. 
21. In reaching this decision, the Council failed to 
address the relevant issues relevant to the Hillside 
Ordinance, basing its decision instead on irrelevant 
considerations such as the potential obstruction of neighbors' 
views and the relative prices paid for surrounding lots. Xd. 
22. On June 14, 1995, Draper City issued a "Stop Work" 
Order to Owners. Owners then filed this action in order to 
seek a conclusive judicial determination that Draper's "Stop 
Work" Order was arbitrary, capricious, and illegal, that it 
violated Owners' vested property right to proceed with the 
development of their property, that Draper lacked jurisdiction 
to issue the "Stop Work" Order after the expiration of the 
appeals period for the April 20, 1995 planning commission 
decision, that Draper was equitably estopped from halting 
Owners' construction efforts and that issuance of the "Stop 
Work" Order under these circumstances was a violation of 
Plaintiffs' constitutional rights protected by the Takings, 
12 
Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States 
and Utah Constitutions. [R. at 298-99], 
23. Draper filed a Motion to Dismiss in which it argued 
that Owners1 Complaint must be construed as a "Petition for 
Review" under Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 and that the trial 
court was therefore limited to determining whether Draper's 
land use decisions were "arbitrary, capricious or illegal." 
[R. at 72-79]. 
24. In a "Ruling" issued on September 27, 1995, the trial 
court held that "the Complaint should be treated as a "Petition 
for Review." [R. at 211-13]. Accordingly, Owners were 
limited in the scope of evidence they were allowed to present 
at trial and were not allowed to put on evidence relating to 
their constitutional claims. !£. 
25. The trial court issued a final "Ruling and Order" on 
November 27, 1995, after having heard evidence at a one-day 
trial on October 12, 1995. In that Ruling and Order the Court 
found Draperfs decision to stop the Owners1 construction on 
their Lot was not arbitrary, capricious or illegal. The Court 
further held that there were no jurisdictional problems and 
that Owners had not obtained a "vested right" to proceed with 
construction and that Draper was not equitably estopped from 
halting Owners1 construction on the Lot. [R. at 222-25]. 
26. Owners filed a timely Notice of Appeal on 
December 22, 1995. [R. at 226-27]. 
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SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT 
1. The Draper Planning Commission voted 5-1 on April 
20, 1995 to allow Owners to proceed with construction of their 
home on the upper end of their Lot. The relaxant Draper Land 
Use Regulations require a written appeal of planning 
commission decisions to be filed with the City Recorder within 
fourteen days. No written appeal of the planning commission's 
decision was filed. After the expiration of the appeals 
period, Owners proceeded, at very substantial expense, to pour 
foundations for a luxury home at the upper end of their Lot. 
The Draper Planning Commission and City Council re-opened and 
reconsidered the permission granted on April 20, 1995 at 
meetings held on June 3 and June 13, 1995. Draper lacked 
jurisdiction, due to the expiration of the applicable appeals 
period, to re-open the issue. 
2. By obtaining a building permit and permission from 
the Draper Planning Commission to build in an area in excess 
of 3 0% slope and by proceeding (after the expiration of all 
relaxant appeals periods) with construction on their home, 
Owners obtained a "vested right" to proceed with construction 
under the rule announced by the Utah Supreme Court in Western 
Land Equities, inc» v* City of Logan, 617 p.2d 388 (Utah 
1980). 
3. Draper is equitably estopped from halting the 
Owners' construction of a home on their Lot after they had 
14 
reasonably and in good faith relied, to their substantial 
detriment, on the April 20, 1995 decision of the Draper 
Planning Commission by expending in excess of $50,000 in 
pouring foundations at the upper end of their Lot. 
4. Owners properly stated claims for relief, sufficient 
to withstand Draper's Motion to Dismiss, for the uncompensated 
taking of their property, for denial of equal protection, for 
declaratory and injunctive relief and for denial of their 
civil rights, which claims the trial court improperly 
dismissed without opportunity for plenary consideration. 
5. The Draper City Council failed to consider the 
appropriate statutory factors in reaching its decision to 
overturn the previously issued permission for Owners to 
proceed with construction on the upper end of their Lot. 
Accordingly, Draper's action was "arbitrary and capricious" and 
should have been reversed by the trial court. 
6. Draper's reversal of the earlier decision to allow 
Owners to proceed with construction of their home on the upper 
end of their Lot was predicated entirely on "public clamor" 
rather than legally sufficient bases for such a decision. For 
this reason too, Draper's decision was arbitrary and 
capricious and should have been overturned by the trial court. 
7. The trial court incorrectly held that the mutual 
mistake of fact upon which the Draper Planning Commission 
relied in allowing Owners to proceed with construction on 
15 
their Lot was a legally sufficient basis to overcome the lack 
of jurisdiction for subsequent re-opening the issue, and that 
this mistake prevented Owners from obtaining a vested right to 
proceed with development and to assert that Draper was 
equitably estopped from halting their construction. 
Persuasive authorities from other jurisdictions indicate that 
where a land-owner has detrimentally relied, expended 
substantial sums of money in improving property, and acted in 
good faith on a mistaken zoning decision, that decision may 
not be re-opened or reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Draper lacked jurisdiction to reconsider or review 
the April 20, 1995 decision by the Draper Planning 
Commission after the expiration of the statutory 
period for appeal of that decision. 
On April 20, 1995 the Draper Planning Commission properly 
considered all of the factors specified by the Draper Hillside 
Ordinance and voted 5-1 to allow Owners to proceed with 
building on the east end of the Lot. 
Specifically, the minutes from that meeting reflect that 
the request was approved because: 
[T]here will be no significant harm caused by 
building the home at the proposed location; the 
proposed modification will result in a more 
functional and improved plan; and there are no 
surrounding property owners who have different 
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expectations of the lot that would interfere with 
going ahead with the building . . . .* 
Ex. 10A at f 7.4. 
Under Section 6-1-4(B) of the Land Use and Development 
Regulations of Draper City, Ex. 11, any appeal from a decision 
of the planning commission "shall be filed in writing with the 
City Recorder within fourteen (14) days of the Planning 
Commission's Decision."2 It is undisputed that no written 
appeal of the April 20, 1995 decision of the Draper Planning 
Commission to allow Owners to proceed with construction on 
their Lot was filed within the appeals time allowed by Draper 
statutes. It is further undisputed that after the expiration 
1
 According to the Draper Hillside Ordinance, the three 
factors that need to be considered when application is made 
to building on slopes of 30% or more are: 
(1) No significant harm will result; 
(2) The proposed modification will result in a more 
functional and improved plan; and 
(3) The developer / builder agrees to comply with any 
conditions and requirements imposed by the Planning Commission 
to mitigate any adverse effects which may result from the 
proposed modification. 
Section 9-15-4(a) Draper City Hillside Ordinance. Ex. 7. The 
planning commission's reference to expectations of surrounding 
lot owners was therefore improper. In context, however, it is 
clear that the April 20, 1995 decision was based on its 
consideration of the factors set forth in the Hillside 
Ordinance. 
2
 There was some testimony at trial that the correct time for 
appeal under Draper's ordinances was actually thirty days. [R. 
at 387]. Even if that longer time period were used, it is 
undisputed that no written appeal of the Planning Commission's 
decision to allow Owners to proceed was filed within 3 0 days 
of the April 20, 1995 decision. Id. 
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of the appeals period for the April 20, 1995 decision, Owners 
incurred substantial additional expense by pouring the 
foundation for a home on the east end of the Lot. 
Notwithstanding the lack of a timely written appeal, the 
Draper Planning Commission reheard the issue of Owners1 
construction on the east end of their Lot on June 8, 1996. 
Owners appeared in person and through counsel at that meeting 
and objected to Draper's lack of jurisdiction on the basis of 
the lack of a timely written appeal. The planning commission 
proceeded to reach the merits of the issue and again voted to 
approve construction at the east (upper) end of their Lot. On 
June 13, 1995 he Draper City Council met to consider, among 
other matters, an "appeal" from the decision of the planning 
commission on June 8, 1995 to allow Owners to proceed with the 
construction of a home on the Lot. Once again, Owners and 
their counsel appeared and objected to the lack of 
jurisdiction. The city council again ignored the 
jurisdictional defect created by the lack of a timely appeal 
and voted to reverse the planning commission's decision to 
allow Owners' construction on the east end of their Lot. 
The jurisdictional defect caused by the lack of timely 
written appeal from the April 20, 1995 decision was briefed 
and argued to the trial court during the judicial review of 
Draper's actions. [R. at 37-38, 352-53]. The trial court 
specifically found, however, that "[t]he Draper City Planning 
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Commission and Draper City Council had jurisdiction to hear 
this matter." [R. at 225]. 
It has repeatedly been held that the policy of the law 
must be to encourage finality of decisions. Accordingly, 
delayed appeals or reconsideration of matters previously ruled 
upon are therefore not proper. See, e.g, Albretson v. Judd. 
709 p.2d 347 (Utah 1985); Robinson & Wells, PtCt Vt Warren, 
669 P.2d 844 (Utah 1983); In re Estate of Ratliff, 431 P.2d 
571 (1967). After the expiration of the appeals period 
established by Draper's ordinances, Owners had an absolute 
right to proceed with the development of their Lot. The fact 
that Owners relied to their detriment on the expiration of 
this appeals period in incurring substantial additional 
construction expenses makes the jurisdictional issue even more 
compelling. The trial court1s ruling that Draper had 
jurisdiction to reconsider the April 20 decision after the 
expiration of the appeals period appears to be based on its 
finding that there had been "a clear mistake of fact (i.e., 
the lack of neighboring property owners [sic] objections)." 
[R. at 223-24]. Nowhere in the record nor in the Draper 
statutes, is there any support for this ruling. There is no 
question that the Court found that any misstatement by Owners 
on this point was made in good faith. At the time of the 
April 20, 1995 decision allowing them to proceed, Owners had 
been informed by the developer of the subdivision that there 
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was no objection to them building at the upper end of their 
lot and Owners so informed the Draper Planning Commission. 
Certain property owners on the street above Owners1 lot 
later asserted that this was incorrect and that they did have 
objections to Owners1 request. There is no legal support, 
however, for the trial court's decision to exempt these owners 
from the requirement of filing a timely appeal under Draper's 
statutes. There is no requirement in either the Draper 
Hillside Ordinance or Draper's Land Use and Development 
Regulations, (or in the applicable provisions of the Utah 
Code) that a municipality or planning commission give notice 
to neighboring property owners of decisions. The planning 
commission meetings are public. Items on the agenda are 
publicly posted. That these non-contiguous "neighbors" did not 
learn of the decision to allow Owners to proceed with 
construction within the time allowed by Draper statutes for an 
appeal is certainly not Owners' fault. It does not justify 
the trial court's decision to ignore the lack of jurisdiction 
resulting from the absence of a timely written appeal. 
The decisions of the Draper Planning Commission and City 
Council taken after the expiration of the appeals period in 
early May 1995 are void and illegal. On that basis alone the 
decision of the trial court to uphold the "Stop Work" Order 
issued by Draper must be reversed. 
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II. The trial court erred in ruling that Owners had not 
obtained a vested right to proceed with the 
construction of a home on their Lot after they had 
obtained a valid building permit and secured 
approval from the Draper Planning Commission and 
the time for all appeals from said decision had 
expired. 
Plaintiffs obtained a valid building permit to build a 
home on the Lot on April 22, 1994. They obtained permission 
from the Draper City Planning Commission to build on the east 
end of the Lot on April 20, 1995. The appeal period for that 
decision expired 14 days later. By complying with Draper's 
procedures and ordinances and obtaining the necessary permits 
and authorizations, Plaintiffs acquired a "vested right" to 
proceed with the development of their property. 
In Western Land Equities. Inc. v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 
388 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court explained need for a 
rule with regard to "vested rights" in the development of real 
property: 
In our view the tests employed by most other 
jurisdictions tend to subject landowners to undue 
and even calamitous expense because of changing 
city councils or zoning boards or their dilatory 
action and to £h£ unpredictable results of 
burdensome litigation. . . . The threat of denial 
of a permit at a late stage of development makes a 
developer vulnerable to shifting governmental 
policies and tempts him to manipulate the process 
by prematurely engaging in activities that would 
establish the substantial reliance required to vest 
his right to develop when inappropriate. 
The economic waste that occurs when a project 
is halted after substantial costs have been 
incurred in its commencement is of not benefit 
either to the public of to landowners. . . . 
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Governmental powers should be exercised in a manner 
that is reasonable and, to the extent possible, 
predictable, 
• • • • 
The above competing interests are best 
accommodated in our view by adopting the rule that 
an applicant is entitled to a building permit or 
subdivision approval if his proposed development 
meets the zoning requirements in existence at the 
time of his application and if he proceeds with 
reasonable diligence, absent a compelling, 
countervailing public interest. 
617 P.2d at 395-96 (emphasis added). 
Exactly as described in the Western Land Equities 
decision, Owners have been subjected to calamitous expense and 
burdensome litigation and delay. They purchased their Lot in 
1994. In 1995, relying in good faith on a properly issued 
building permit and authorization from the Draper Planning 
Commission (which was not appealed) they expended over 
$100,000 in partially constructing a luxury home on that Lot. 
They have now been stopped for more than a year by a 
capricious vot~. of the Draper City Council. If this ruling 
stands, there will be huge economic waste. Owners will have 
expended more than $100,000 to no useful end. The "lower" 
portion of the Lot is unbuildable. The "half-constructed" 
foundations are an eye-sore and, perhaps a danger to the 
public. Under the "rule" established by Western Land Equities, 
the Owners1 right to proceed with their construction "vested" 
when they obtained a valid building permit, permission to 
construct on the east portion of their lot, and they undertook 
22 
made by the Draper Planning Commission and City Council. 
Effectively, Owners were precluded from pursuing the state and 
federal constitutional claims set forth in their verified 
complaint or from obtaining declaratory or injunctive relief 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 et seg. had the effect of 
dismissing has filed a motion to dismiss, the sole purpose of 
which is to cause Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint to be 
"characterized as an appeal of the City Council's decision 
with the proceedings going forward as contemplated by Utah 
Code Annotated Section 10-9-1001." Reply Brief in Support of 
Motion to Dismiss, at 4. The error in depriving Owners of 
t,hese remedies, without any hearing on their merits, warrants 
a reversal of the trial court's ruling on the Motion to 
Dismiss. 
Utah law with respect to motions to dismiss is well 
established. Such motions may be granted only under extremely 
limited circumstances. A motion to dismiss "admits all of the 
facts alleged" in the complaint or petition. Russell v. 
Standard CorPt/ 898 P.2d 263 (Utah 1995); stf Benedict*? Pevt 
Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991). 
Further# it has repeatedly been held that a complaint may not 
be dismissed for failure to state a claim "unless it appears 
to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no 
relief under any state of facts which could be proved in 
support of the claim." Christensen v. Lelis Automatic 
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Transmission SerVt, InCt, 467 P.2d 605 (Utah 1970). Moreover, 
in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must construe the 
complaint or petition in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff and indulge in all reasonable inferences in favor of 
the plaintiff or petitioner. Russell yf Standard CorPt/ 898 
p.2d 263 (Utah 1995); Mounteer Yt Utah Power & Light Co,, 823 
P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991). It is not required that a complaint 
spell out in detail all of the grounds upon which relief is 
sought. It is sufficient if the complaint or petition gives 
the other party "fair notice" of the nature and basis or 
grounds of the claim and a "general indication" of the type of 
litigation involved. Utah Steel & Iron Co. v. Boschf 475 P.2d 
1019 (Utah 1970). 
As applied to the present case, the foregoing authorities 
demonstrate the clear error of the trial court in dismissing 
several of Owners1 claims for relief. Unquestionably, Owners 
had the statutory right to have the Draper City Council's 
decision reviewed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001. The 
remedy provided by that statute is only one of several bases 
upon which Owners are entitled to seek judicial relief from 
the actions of Draper. 
A. Ownerg have a direct right of action under Article 
I § 22 Pf the Utah Constitution. 
in Colroan Vt Utah State Land Beard, 795 p.2d. 622 (Utah 
1990) the Utah Supreme Court expressly overturned prior case 
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law to the contrary and held that Article I § 22 of the Utah 
Constitution, which states that "[p]rivate property shall not 
be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation" 
is "self-executing" and gave rise to a direct cause of action 
for its violation. Xd* at 635. The Colman decision also was 
very clear in establishing the type of interference with 
property rights that would give rise to a direct claim for a 
"taking" under Article I § 22: "A 'taking' is any substantial 
interference with private property which destroys or 
materially lessens its value, or by which the owner's right to 
its use and enjoyment is in any substantial degree abridged or 
destroyed. " J&. at 62 6. For purposes of this motion to 
dismiss, the Court must accept as true the allegations set 
forth in Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint. Russell v. Standard 
Corp.f 898 p.2d 263 (Utah 1995); gtt Benedict's PeVt CQT Vt 
St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991). Those 
allegations unquestionably establish a prima facie showing 
that the value of Plaintiffs' property has been materially 
lessened or that their right to its use and enjoyment has been 
abridged to a very substantial degree. Accordingly, 
Plaintiffs have a right to assert a "takings" claim under the 
Utah State Constitution. 
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B. Owners are entitled tQ geek Declaratory and/or 
injunctive relief* 
Section 10-9-1001 is not the only Utah statutory basis 
for Owners1 challenge to Draper's decisions affecting their 
Lot. Pursuant to § 78-33-1 and 2 of the Utah Code Ann, the 
trial court also had jurisdiction to hear and determine the 
rights of the Plaintiffs as they have been affected by the 
decisions of Draper City and its application of the Hillside 
Ordinance. Reported decisions of the Utah Supreme Court 
recognize this use of the Declaratory Relief statutes. E.g. 
Thurston v. Cache Countyf 626 P.2d. 440 (Utah 1981). 
Plaintiffs have properly alleged this independent grounds for 
the Court to review the actions of the Draper City Council. 
See Verified Complaint, [R. at 11-12]. 
C. Owners also have stated valid claims under the 
Fifvh and Fourteenth Amendment? to the United 
States Constitution-
Obviously, Owners1 constitutional protection against 
uncompensated taking is not limited to the Utah State 
Constitution. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution also provide bases for challenging governmental 
actions which deprive property owners of the use, enjoyment or 
value of their property. See, e.g., First English Evangelical 
Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles Countyf 107 S Ct. 2378 (1987). 
Owners have thus also properly stated a cause of action for 
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the taking of their federally protected constitutional rights. 
£££_Verified Complaint, [R at 14-15]. 
D. Owners have stated a claim for relief under 42 
UtStCt § 1983. 
Pursuant to the decision of the United States Supreme 
court in Moneii v. New York city Department of Social 
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), local governments are deemed to 
be "persons" who can be sued under § 1983 when an action of the 
local government causes a deprivation of a constitutionally 
protected right. It has been held that an improper denial of 
a building permit was sufficient to state a cause of action 
under § 1983. See Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124 (3d Cir.), 
certt denied 488 U.S. 868 (1988); see also Jacobs Visconsi & 
Jacobs Vt City of Lawreira, 927 F.2d 1111 (loth cir. 1991) 
(due process rights arise when plaintiffs have legitimate 
expectation of a given outcome under applicable zoning laws). 
In the present case, Owners have alleged that they had a 
building permit, properly issued by Draper and that they had 
also received permission from the Draper City Planning 
Commission to build on the east end of their lot. They have 
further alleged that all appeal periods pertaining to this 
decision had expired. Under these circumstances, the Owners 
had a legitimate expectation and constitutionally protected 
right to the use and enjoyment of their property, which they 
have been deprived of by the actions of Draper. Accordingly, 
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they have stated a proper cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983. 
The trial court's implicit dismissal of all Owners1 
claims for relief (with the exception of their request for 
judicial review under § 10-9-1001) was improper and 
inconsistent with the legal requirements for the dismissal of 
causes of action under Rule 12(b)(6), For this reason too, 
the trial court must be reversed. 
V. The trial court erred in ruling that Draper City 
Council's reversal of the earlier decision of the 
Draper Planning Commission was not arbitrary, 
capricious or illegal in light of the Council1s 
failure to address the appropriate factors 
specified by the Draper City's Hillside Ordinance. 
The trial court's review of the Draper City Council's 
reversal of the permission given to Owners to proceed with 
construction on their lot is to determine whether such a 
decision was "arbitrary, capricious or illegal." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-9-1001(3). Although the trial court may not substitute 
its judgment for that of the city council, the council's 
decision is arbitrary and capricious if not made on the basis 
of appropriate considerations. See Patterson v. Utah County 
Board of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 604-05 ("We must determine 
on the basis of the evidence before the Board, whether a 
reasonable mind could reach the same conclusion.") Moreover, 
even if the considerations or reasons given for an action are 
otherwise legally sufficient, a land use planning decision may 
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still be arbitrary when the stated reasons lack sufficient 
factual basis. Davis County v. Clearfield Cityr 756 P.2d 704, 
711 (Utah App. 1988) . 
The Draper Hillside Zoning Ordinance identifies three 
specific factors that need to be considered when application 
is made to building on slopes of 3 0% or more. These factors 
are: 
(1) No significant harm will result; 
(2) The proposed modification will result in a more 
functional and improved plan; and 
(3) The developer / builder agrees to comply with any 
conditions and requirements imposed by the Planning 
Commission to mitigate any adverse effects which 
may result from the proposed modification. 
Section 9-15-4(a) Draper City Hillside Ordinance. Ex. 7 
at Section 9-15-4. The decisions of the Planning Commission 
to allow Owners to proceed with construction on the east end 
of their Lot were based on a consideration of these factors. 
See Ex. 10A at 9-10. In overturning those decisions, however, 
the Draper City Council in its meeting of June 13, 1995, 
failed to base its decision on any of these factors. Instead, 
the Council focused on concerns voiced by neighbors as to 
potential effects upon their views, and the prices they had 
paid for their lots. Moreover, the City Council improperly 
limited Plaintiffs1 opportunity to be heard at the meeting 
before making its decision. [R. at 297]. Because the stated 
grounds for Draper City Council's decision were not proper 
under the relevant statute, the decision was arbitrary and 
31 
capricious and should have been overturned. The trial court 
should be reversed on this point. 
VI. The decision of the Draper City Council to reverse 
the earlier decision of the Draper City Planning 
Commission based on "public clamor" rather than a 
consideration of the appropriate decision-making 
factors. 
In several reported decisions, the appellate courts of 
Utah and other states have held that "public clamor" is not an 
adequate basis for land use planning decisions. In Davis 
County Vt Clearfield City, 756 p.2d 704, (Utah App. 1988), the 
Utah Court of Appeals held that although "sentiments [of 
neighboring landowners] may be weighed in a zoning decision, 
they may not be the sole basis for granting or denying a given 
permit." Id. at 712 quoting City Of Bamum Vt County of 
Carlton, 386 N.W. 2d 770 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) . As the court 
further explained: 
[The] decision appears to have been merely a 
response to public opposition. This is an 
insufficient basis upon which to deny a conditional 
use permit. A county must rely on facts, and not 
mere emotion or local opinion, in making SUOh a 
decision* 
Similarly, in Thurston v. Cache Countyf 626 P.2d 440, 445 
(Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court also indicated that "the 
consent of neighboring landowners may not be made a criterion 
for the issuance or denial [of] a conditional use permit." 
It is readily apparent that, just as in the Davis County 
case, the only real basis for Draper City Council's reversal 
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of the decision to allow Owners to proceed with the 
construction on the east end of their lot was the objection of 
neighboring landowners who were concerned about possible 
impact on the views from their lots or (even important) the 
fact that Owners had paid less for their Lot that these 
neighbors had and that it was somehow unfair for Owners to 
obtain a good view without having paid for it! Ex. IOC at 38-
39. None of the concerns expressed on the record at the June 
13, 1995 meeting of the Draper City Council provides an 
appropriate basis for the reversal of the planning 
commission's decision to allow Owners to proceed with 
construction on their Lot. Instead; the decision clearly 
appears to have been based on nothing more than opposition by 
non-contiguous neighbors. Such "public clamor" does not—as 
a matter of law—provide a legally sufficient basis for zoning 
decisions. Draper's actions in stopping construction on 
Owners' Lot were therefore arbitrary and capricious and should 
have been reversed by the trial court. 
VII. The trial court erred, in light of its express 
finding that the Draper City Planning Commission 
granted permission to Appellants to proceed with 
construction on the basis of a mutual mistake of 
fact (with no bad faith or deceit on the part of 
Appellants) in determining that Draper had the 
authority and right to reconsider the planning 
commission's earlier action. 
To a very substantial degree, the trial court's ruling in 
this case that Draper could re-open the issue of Owners' 
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construction on their Lot was based on its finding that the 
planning commission's earlier decision had been based upon a 
mutual mistake of fact — the assumption by all parties that 
the neighbors who had previously expressed concerns about 
Owners' plans for their Lot no longer objected. Because it 
found the decision of the Planning Commission to have been 
based upon that mutual mistake, the trial court did not 
enforce the jurisdictional limit imposed by the appeals 
deadline, did not find that Owners had a vested right to 
proceed with development of their Lot and did not find that 
Draper was equitably estopped from halting Owners1 
construction on their Lot. [R. at 224-25]. There is no 
question that Owners acted in good faith in obtaining 
permission from the planning commission to proceed with 
construction. Indeed, the trial court made a specific finding 
that Owners had not acted in bad faith. Thus, the question 
raised by this case is the legal effect of land use decision 
made on the basis of a good-faith, mutual mistake and relied 
upon by Owners. 
There is no law on this issue in the State of Utah. 
Other jurisdictions have issued decisions in similar 
circumstances that support the right of Owners to proceed with 
construction once they have relied in good faith on a 
mistakenly granted zoning decision. In Commonwealth v. Flynn 
344 A.2d 720 (Comm. Ct. Pa. 1975), for example, the court 
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ruled that a property owner's good faith reliance on a permit 
issued by a municipality should afford him a vested right to 
complete construction, even though the building permit was 
issued in error. Significant factors that the court found to 
support this decision were: (1) the time to appeal the 
decision to issue the permit had expired; (2) there was no 
evidence that public health, safety or welfare would be 
adversely affected by the use of the permit; (3) the owner 
acted in good faith; and (4) the owner had spent a substantial 
amount of unrecoverable funds that would be "wasted" in 
detrimental reliance on the validity of the permit. 344 A.2d 
at 724-25. Each of these factors is also found in the present 
case. 
similarly in Aranogian Oil CQ, V, City Qf Portsmouth, 612 
A.2d 357 (N.H. 1992) the Supreme Court of New Hampshire ruled 
that a zoning board could not reverse an earlier decision 
allowing a property owner to proceed with renovations on its 
property on the basis of an error by a zoning official in 
reviewing the zoning application. Once again in this case, 
the Court found persuasive the fact that the owner had spent 
approximately $45,000 in making renovations under the zoning 
pe :mit. 
For precisely the same reasons set forth in these 
decisions, Owners should be allowed to complete the 
construction of the home on their Lot. The time for appealing 
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the planning commission's decision had run prior to Owners1 
expenditure of funds to pour their foundation. The Owners1 
reliance on the planning commission decision was made in 
complete good faith. No harm to public health or safety will 
result from a decision to allow Owners to proceed.3 The 
Owners1 good faith reliance on the earlier decision of the 
planning commission has cost them approximately $50,000, which 
amount will be completely wasted if the construction is 
halted. To avoid this inequitable result, the decision of the 
trial court should be reversed and Owners should be allowed to 
complete construction of their home. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the foregoing cases and authorities, 
Owners respectfully request that this Court reverse and, as 
appropriate, remand this matter for further proceedings 
consistent with the established Utah precedent upon which they 
rely. 
Dated this of September, 1996. 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
Bv: > ? ^ l ^ S k 
Mark E. Wilkey ^ N T 
Gregory D. Phillips j 
Attorneys for Appellant?? 
3
 If construction is halted at its present state, however, 
there may be a dangerous and unsightly condition in which a 
partially completed foundation is left "sticking out" of the 
top of the sloped lot. 
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copy of the foregoing was served via United States mail, first 
class postage prepaid on the following: 
Michael Z. Hayes, Esq. 
Mazuran & Hayes 
1245 East Brickyard Road, #250 
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37 
